Enumeration & Reconnaissance
I started with an Nmap scan to identify open ports and services on the Responder target. The results showed standard Windows services: SMB (port 445), WinRM (port 5985), and several others typical of a Windows domain-joined machine.
The target appeared to be a Windows workstation joined to an internal domain. With no credentials initially available, I turned to network-based attack vectors to capture authentication material from network traffic.
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning
LLMNR and NBT-NS are protocols that Windows uses to resolve hostnames when DNS lookup fails. When a user or service mistypes a hostname, Windows broadcasts a query to the local link asking if any machine matches the requested name. These protocols send the username and NetNTLMv2 hash as part of the authentication challenge-response exchange.
I ran Responder in analysis mode to listen for LLMNR and NBT-NS traffic on the network:
sudo responder -I eth0 -w -rfAfter a short wait, Responder captured a NetNTLMv2 hash from a DNS resolution failure triggered by a scheduled task or user action on the target. The captured hash contained the username and domain information.
Hash Capture & Cracking
The captured NetNTLMv2 hash was saved to Responder logs in the format:
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Hash captured from: 10.10.10.181USER:Administrator DOMAIN:RESPONDER OS:Windows Server 2019Hash: administrator::RESPONDER:1122334455667788:...:... I used hashcat with the rockyou wordlist to crack the hash offline:
hashcat -m 5600 hash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --forceWithin seconds, hashcat recovered the plaintext password, confirming weak password hygiene on the target.
WinRM Access & Lateral Movement
With valid administrator credentials, I connected to the target using evil-winrm, which provides a PowerShell-based remote session on Windows machines with WinRM enabled:
evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.181 -u administrator -p [cracked_password]The session opened with Administrator privileges on the target, providing full access to the file system, registry, and processes.
Privilege Escalation to SYSTEM
Since I connected as the built-in Administrator account, I already had the highest level of access on the Windows system. I retrieved the user flag from the Desktop and the root flag from the Administrator Desktop:
Flag Capture
type C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\user.txttype C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt